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Preface  
 
This Issues paper has been prepared by the International Labour Office as a basis for discussions at the 
Global Dialogue Forum on the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Finance Sector Workers (Geneva, 24–
25 February 2009), but of necessity is being produced only days before the Forum takes place. The 
Committee on Sectoral and Technical Meetings and Related Issues of the Governing Body of the ILO 
decided at its 303rd Session (November 2008) that a two-day tripartite global dialogue forum on the 
impact of the financial crisis on financial sector workers would be held in the week of 23–27 February 
2009. It was proposed that the Forum be composed of ten Employer and ten Worker participants; and 
be open to representatives of all interested governments. Other interested Employer and Worker 
participants and representatives of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations 
could also attend. It was later decided by the Officers of the Governing Body that the that the Forum be 
composed of 14 Employer and 14 Worker participants, selected after consultations with the respective 
groups of the Governing Body; and be open to representatives of all interested governments.  The 
purpose of the Forum is to propose and assess ways of alleviating and mitigating the impact of the crisis 
on workers in the financial services sector. The forum could adopt recommendations that would be the 
basis of subsequent action by the ILO and its constituents.  
This Forum is part of the ILO’s Sectoral Activities Programme, as defined by the ILO 
programme and budget, the aim of which is to assist governments, and employers’ and workers’ 
organizations to develop their capacities to deal equitably and effectively with the social and labour 
problems of particular economic sectors. The programme also offers a means of alerting the ILO to 
specific sectoral social and labour issues. In addition to sectoral action programmes (launched in 2004), 
technical cooperation, advisory and research activities, the programme of tripartite meetings and forums 
also contributes to ILO strategic objectives. Such meetings bring together a cross-section of 
Government, Employer and Worker representatives from countries that are prominent or have a strong 
interest in a given sector. In line with the ILO’s strategic objectives, these meetings also aim to 
strengthen tripartism and promote social dialogue at the international level. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly review the background, causes, characteristics and trajectory of 
the ongoing financial and economic crisis; to define the financial services sector, its occupations and 
their educational requirements, as well as recent important trends; to provide a preliminary assessment 
of the impact of the crisis on finance sector jobs; and to give suggestions on possible policy responses 
to address the effects of the crisis on finance sector workers. 
How the crisis started 
Today’s disastrous financial and economic problems had their origins in a steep contraction in credit, 
full effect of which started to be felt in August 2007. It has since metastasized into what is now 
arguably the direst financial and economic crisis the world has experienced since the 1930s. 
 However, the roots of the crisis can be traced further back, to the deflation of the high-tech 
bubble of a decade ago. When the stock markets began a steep decline in 2000 and the global economy 
started to slide into a recession, the United States Federal Reserve and other central banks sharply 
lowered interest rates to limit the economic damage. The sustained lower interest rates fuelled a 
mortgage-borrowing boom, while also encouraging millions of homeowners to refinance their existing 
mortgages. A financial innovation that separated mortgage origination from lending decisions added to 
the mix, with half a million independent American mortgage brokers being paid commissions to 
prospect for homebuyers on behalf of mortgage lenders, with those commissions based solely on the 
number of clients they brought to the lenders. The ability of the customer to repay the mortgage was of 
no concern, because of yet another innovation. 
 Traditionally, banks had financed housing loans mainly through customer deposits, which had a 
limiting effect on the amount they could lend. In recent years, however, the financial industry had 
developed new business models that greatly expanded the funds available to increase mortgage lending 
dramatically.  Mortgage lenders could immediately sell on to investment banks the home loans they 
made to borrowers, and the investment banks, in turn, would bundle thousands of such mortgages 
together, dice and slice them, and then sell them as “investment-grade” mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) on to investors who were eager for high-yielding investment products in a low-interest 
environment. These securities, many including sub-prime loans made to people with low credit scores, 
were often given “triple–A” rating by the major credit-rating agencies, in return for a fee from the 
issuers. 
 As the industry expanded rapidly, the quality of the mortgages it issued started to deteriorate, 
eventually turning sour when many homebuyers became over-leveraged. Not surprisingly, impairment 
rates exploded from 2006 without, however, a slowdown in the pace of lending. All the parties in the 
chain had become addicted to the high profits to be gained from churning out and selling these 
securities. Banks themselves had set up highly leveraged, off-balance-sheet, structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs) to buy and hold some of these securities on their own account in order to maximize 
returns. Once the era of low interest rates ended, and many of the adjustable rate mortgages -- which 
were the bedrock of subprime mortgages -- were reset higher, more and more borrowers started to 
default and the crisis began to snowball towards disaster. 
 In February 2007, one major European bank issued the first major warning, writing down tens 
of billions of dollars in losses from a 2002 acquisition of an American sub-prime lender. Four months 
later, two hedge funds belonging to a major investment bank/securities dealer closed, due to their 
exposure to the housing market. In August 2007, another major European bank froze withdrawals in 
three of its investment funds, setting off a panic by people worried that if a bank with no obvious 
exposure to the American mortgage market could have this measure of difficulty, anyone could be 
hiding untold losses.  
 Thus the credit crisis began in earnest, as mutual distrust amongst major financial institutions in 
the global market for inter-bank loans spread, and credit became harder and harder for any bank to 
obtain. By September 2007, liquidity in the inter-bank market had evaporated to the extent that rumours 
were rife about various institutions receiving most of their funding from the wholesale money markets. 
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One of them, Northern Rock, a British home loan provider, became the first target of a bank run in the 
United Kingdom for about 150 years, requiring the Bank of England to bail out the company, and to 
subsequently nationalize it altogether.  
 Meanwhile United States housing prices continued an inexorable decline, resulting in massive 
losses tied to different kinds of mortgage-related derivative assets held by large global banks. The first 
wave of such losses was concentrated in instruments and investment vehicles with such exotic names 
as: RMBSs (Residential Mortgage Backed Securities), CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations), SIVs 
(Structured Investment Vehicles) and CDOs of CDOs. Merrill Lynch was the first to report a large loss, 
at US$5.5 billion on 5 October 2007, only to return less than three weeks later to report that the losses 
were now over US$8 billion. During 2008, the cumulative loss in US home values -- on which all these 
mortgage-backed securities were based -- would total US$3.3 trillion. Since the housing market’s peak 
in 2006, home values had lost approximately a massive US$6.1 trillion. This implies that a high 
proportion of the securities written on the underlying mortgages have become “toxic” and were they to 
be “marked to market,” shareholders’ equity of a large swath of the US financial industry would be 
wiped out, as would counterparts in a wide range of financial contracts in the wider global industry. 
Many economists and other finance experts now predict that the growing losses could very easily 
overwhelm American financial institutions’ assets, and their country’s banking system.1 They therefore 
urge the Government to weed out the weakest banks, inject capital into the surviving banks, and sell off 
 
1
 Steve Lohr, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/business/economy/13insolvent.html?_r=1&hp: Ailing Banks 
May Require More Aid to Keep Solvent. 
 
Box 1:  Understanding the role of financial leverage or gearing in the crisis 
 
A key contributory factor to the extensive financial meltdown was the widespread use of leverage by financial 
institutions to pump up profits during the boom period; the reverse -- deleveraging -- is likewise accentuating 
the effects of the deflation. To understand the process, let us take an example: a bank that borrows money at 
2% to invest in a mortgage-backed security (MBS) portfolio, using the portfolio as collateral. The bank then 
uses the funds to expand its MBS portfolio, which pays a 5% interest rate (possible because of the higher-risk 
mortgages comprising the MBS). The 3% difference between the amounts is the “spread”. For every US$100 
invested, the bank’s profit margin is $3. This provides an incentive to borrow and invest as much as possible, 
an investment strategy known as “leveraging”. Such leverage is generally safe in rising markets and was 
considered safe while the housing market was booming (until early 2007), especially as MBS portfolios 
typically received high credit-ratings and defaults were minimal. Investment banks, which do not have the 
same capital reserve requirements as depository banks, were particularly active, borrowing and lending 
amounts exceeding 30 times their net worth. In contrast, depository banks rarely lend more than 15 times their 
net worth. The US Government-sponsored mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were each 
leveraged nearly 80 times their respective net worth. However, even depository banks could get around the 
regulatory restriction against excessive lending by setting up off-balance-sheet structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs) for this purpose. 
 
Leverage was extremely profitable for the financial institutions engaged in it, as long as there were no 
problems with the underlying MBS portfolios. However, these portfolios started to experience increasing 
delinquencies and foreclosures from early 2007 and their values declined precipitously. Investors then became 
concerned, and started demanding their money back, resulting in margin calls (immediate need to 
sell/liquidate the MBS portfolios at fire-sale prices) to pay them. At such a high leverage, many banks and 
mortgage companies suffered huge losses, bankruptcy, or were forced to merge with other institutions to 
survive. 
 
With banks and investors unable to sell their portfolios of MBS securities readily, these are now considered 
“toxic” (i.e. they have become “illiquid”), and their values have plummeted. The ability of financial institutions to 
raise funds via MBS has therefore all but evaporated. The crisis has now spread to other types of credit 
markets including all asset-backed securities, high-yield corporate bonds, the inter-bank market, commercial 
paper, money-market funds, the auction-rate market, hedge funds and the real economy. Banks and other 
financial institutions around the world are writing down billions of dollars of losses, and housing markets 
beyond the United States are falling including in Ireland, Spain and the UK, making the crisis truly global. 
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the bad assets. These are similar measures to those the Government of Japan had to adopt from 2001 to 
2003 to overcome its decade of economic stagnation in the 1990s. The Government of Sweden had to 
take similarly tough steps in 1992 and the American Government did the same in 1987-89 to overcome 
the savings and loan crisis. One prominent economist estimates that total losses on loans by American 
financial firms and the fall in the market value of the assets they hold will reach US$3.6 trillion, and 
that nationalization, recapitalization and eventual resale may be the only option.2 
Defining the financial services sector 
For the purposes of this paper, the financial services sector includes the following main sub-sectors: 
• Banking industry (retail banking and wholesale banking acting on national, regional or global 
financial market); 
• Insurance industry (life insurance, non-life – including motor and property, etc.) and re-
insurance; and 
• Insurance and financial intermediaries (e.g. hedge funds, mutual funds, wealth management 
firms, insurance agents and financial advisors, etc.) 
Wall Street in New York is the pre-eminent centre of global finance, while London is the European 
financial hub. The financial markets have experienced explosive growth over the past two decades, and 
banks and other financial firms have become global players. In Europe, for instance, banks’ total assets 
and total loans expanded by 18% and 6% respectively over the two years 2006-07, just before the onset 
of the current crisis. Similarly, from 1996 to 2005, the United States and European insurance markets 
doubled in size; the corresponding growth in Asia was only 8%, mainly as a result of Japan’s financial 
stagnation over the period. The Chinese and Indian insurance sectors were also beginning to expand 
significantly, while Australia’s large financial groups were expected to improve their share of the 
region’s market. 
 The EU27 financial services sector employed 5.6 million people in 2006, with banking and 
insurance accounting for 75% and 20% respectively. Five per cent of financial services workers are 
employed with other financial intermediaries.  The sector represented 2.7% of total employment in the 
EU27, a much smaller employment share than that of the US, where the share was 4.7% of total 
employment, representing 4.1 million workers, 44% of whom were in banking and the rest in insurance 
and associated services. 
 Financial services employment expansion has been slow, with overall EU27 growth at only 
0.5% between 1996 and 2006. To put this into perspective, the increase of total employment of other 
services sectors during the period was 3%.  The reason for this disparity in growth is explained in large 
measure by extensive mergers and acquisitions leading to consolidation and restructuring of the 
financial services sector as firms sought economies of scale and scope to increase their productivity and 
ability to compete on regional and global markets. Notwithstanding the low average rate of Europe-
wide growth, financial services employment did increase substantially in several countries including 
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
Conversely, employment declined in Finland, Germany and Portugal, and remained stable in Austria, 
Belgium and Italy.  
The share of financial services in overall employment varies among countries. In the United 
Kingdom the sector enjoys a pre-eminent status, with 4.8% of national employment. The Netherlands is 
second with 3.9%, while Germany’s and France’s finance sectors each have a 3.4% share. Luxembourg 
is a special case, with a very large financial services sector relative to national employment (11.9%).  
Together the financial services jobs of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom account for about 75% of the EU27 financial services workforce. 
 The United States financial services sector comprises banking; insurance; and securities, 
commodities and other investments.  In 2006 the sector employed approximately 8.363 million workers, 
distributed as follows: about 1.825 million in banking; roughly 2.3 million in insurance and 0.816 
million in securities, commodities and other investments, and the balance in real-estate-related 
 
2
 Nouriel Roubini, professor of economics at the Stern School of Business at New York University, recognized as 
one of the most prescient about the gathering credit problems. 
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activities.  Its growth trajectory before the crisis indicated the sector would be employing 9.57 million 
workers by 2016; an increase of 14.4% over 2006.  
 Office and administrative support workers constitute 2 out of 3 banking jobs, while tellers 
account for about 3 in 10. Opportunities were expected to continue to be available for tellers and other 
office and administrative support workers, given the number of workers in these occupations and the 
high rate of staff turnover. Tables 1-4, from the US Bureau for Labor Statistics (BLS) provide 
employment figures by occupation, the share of the occupation in total branch employment and 
projected percentage change between 2006 and 2016 for banking, insurance, and securities, 
commodities, and other investments. 
 
Table 1. Employment (in thousands) of wage and salary workers in banking by occupation, 2006 and 
projected change, 2006-2016. 
Employment, 
2006 
Occupation Number Percent 
Percent change, 
2006-16 
All occupations 1,825 100.0 4.0 
    
Management, business, and financial occupations 449 24.6 5.4 
General and operations managers 34 1.8 -8.4 
Marketing and sales managers 11 0.6 1.9 
Financial managers 73 4.0 1.9 
Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 15 0.8 5.3 
Management analysts 8 0.5 1.4 
Accountants and auditors 27 1.5 1.7 
Credit analysts 15 0.8 -8.3 
Financial analysts 18 1.0 11.4 
Personal financial advisors 24 1.3 22.3 
Loan officers 133 7.3 12.1 
    
Professional and related occupations 72 4.0 6.9 
Computer specialists 56 3.0 8.8 
    
Sales and related occupations 82 4.5 11.8 
Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents 50 2.7 17.2 
    
Office and administrative support occupations 1,202 65.9 2.9 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative 
support workers 
111 6.1 -5.2 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 63 3.5 1.7 
Tellers 546 29.9 12.1 
Brokerage clerks 9 0.5 -1.0 
Customer service representatives 106 5.8 12.0 
New accounts clerks 73 4.0 -18.4 
Receptionists and information clerks 9 0.5 1.5 
Couriers and messengers 6 0.3 -8.3 
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants 36 2.0 1.9 
Secretaries, except legal, medical, and executive 15 0.8 -9.6 
Data entry keyers 8 0.5 -18.6 
Office clerks, general 40 2.2 0.2 
Office machine operators, except computer 12 0.6 -14.9 
Note: Columns may not add to totals due to omission of occupations with small employment 
Source: BLS. 
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Prior to the crisis, employment in the insurance branch was projected to rise by 7.4% between 2006 and 
2016, with growth constrained only by corporate downsizing, new technology, and an increase in direct 
mail, telephone and Internet sales. Job openings would mainly be to replace departing or retiring 
workers. Growth would also be driven by medical services and health insurance, and insurers’ 
continuing expansion into other areas of financial services, such as securities and mutual funds. 
Table 2. Employment (in thousands) of wage and salary workers in insurance by occupation, 2006 and 
projected change, 2006-2016. 
Employment 
2006 
Occupation Number Percent 
Percent change, 
2006-16 
All occupations 2,316 100.0 7.4 
Management, business, and financial occupations 661 28.6 8.3 
General and operations managers 41 1.8 -1.9 
Marketing and sales managers 20 0.9 7.2 
Computer and information systems managers 14 0.6 5.9 
Financial managers 24 1.0 6.6 
Claims adjusters, examiners, and investigators 218 9.4 10.8 
Insurance appraisers, auto damage 12 0.5 12.0 
Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 28 1.2 10.9 
Management analysts 29 1.2 5.4 
Accountants and auditors 40 1.7 7.8 
Financial analysts 16 0.7 16.9 
Insurance underwriters 91 3.9 5.6 
    
Professional and related occupations 258 11.2 8.6 
Computer programmers 21 0.9 -15.1 
Computer software engineers 28 1.2 24.7 
Computer support specialists 19 0.8 6.8 
Computer systems analysts 33 1.4 15.5 
Actuaries 11 0.5 5.4 
Market research analysts 12 0.5 6.5 
Lawyers 12 0.5 5.6 
Title examiners, abstractors, and searchers 23 1.0 -5.5 
    
Sales and related occupations 367 15.8 14.4 
First-line supervisors/managers of non-retail sales workers 18 0.8 3.8 
Insurance sales agents 313 13.5 15.7 
    
Office and administrative support occupations 1,009 43.6 4.0 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support 
workers 
62 2.7 -6.0 
Billing and posting clerks and machine operators 18 0.8 -2.5 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 47 2.0 8.9 
Customer service representatives 266 11.5 19.2 
File clerks 15 0.7 -45.3 
Receptionists and information clerks 24 1.0 10.0 
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants 57 2.4 8.2 
Secretaries, except legal, medical, and executive 62 2.7 -1.5 
Data entry keyers 22 0.9 -13.5 
Insurance claims and policy processing clerks 222 9.6 -2.6 
Mail clerks and mail machine operators, except postal service 14 0.6 -21.0 
Office clerks, general 106 4.6 7.8 
Source: BLS. 
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Pre-crisis, the securities, commodities and other investments branch was predicted to generate 
the highest 2006-16 employment increase, of 46.1%, mainly due to expectations of increasing 
investment in securities and commodities, along with growing need for investment advice. 
Notwithstanding anticipated high job growth, it was projected that high earnings of successful securities 
sales agents and investment bankers would result in keen competition for such positions, which require 
degree qualifications. 
 
Table 3. Employment of wage and salary workers in securities, commodities, and other investments by 
occupation, 2006 and projected change, 2006-2016. (Employment in thousands) 
Employment 2006 
Occupation Number Percent 
Percent 
change, 
2006-16 
All occupations 816 100.0 46.1 
    
Management, business, and financial occupations 268 32.8 57.9 
General and operations managers 15 1.8 30.2 
Marketing and sales managers 10 1.2 45.6 
Computer and information systems managers 8 1.0 45.5 
Financial managers 33 4.1 45.6 
Compliance officers, except agriculture, construction, health and 
safety, and transportation 
6 0.7 43.6 
Human resources, training, and labor relations specialists 6 0.7 49.9 
Management analysts 6 0.8 44.8 
Accountants and auditors 21 2.6 52.2 
Financial analysts 48 5.9 68.9 
Personal financial advisors 72 8.8 78.8 
    
Professional and related occupations 84 10.3 55.7 
Computer programmers 6 0.8 15.8 
Computer software engineers 21 2.6 72.4 
Computer support specialists 8 1.0 42.8 
Computer systems analysts 10 1.2 58.4 
Network and computer systems administrators 6 0.8 58.2 
Market research analysts 7 0.9 45.1 
Lawyers 4 0.5 43.8 
    
Sales and related occupations 184 22.5 35.6 
Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents 166 20.4 35.2 
    
Office and administrative support occupations 273 33.4 38.7 
First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative support 
workers 
18 2.2 35.1 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 18 2.2 43.7 
Brokerage clerks 55 6.8 25.7 
Customer service representatives 34 4.1 68.9 
Receptionists and information clerks 7 0.8 44.1 
Executive secretaries and administrative assistants 43 5.3 44.5 
Secretaries, except legal, medical, and executive 20 2.5 28.0 
Office clerks, general 44 5.4 44.1 
Note: Columns may not add to totals due to omission of occupations with small employment.  Source: BLS 
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Table 4. Percent distribution of employment and establishments in securities, commodities and other 
investments by detailed industry sector, 2006 
Industry segment Employment Establishments 
   
Total 100.0 100.0 
   
Contracts intermediation and brokerage 61.0 41.0 
Securities brokerage 36.4 25.0 
Investment banking and securities dealing 21.6 12.2 
Commodity contracts brokerage 1.6 2.0 
Commodity contracts dealing 1.3 1.7 
   
Security and commodity exchanges 1.1 0.3 
   
Other financial investment activities 37.9 58.7 
Investment advice 14.9 32.1 
Portfolio management 14.7 15.7 
All other financial investment activities 5.4 3.9 
Miscellaneous intermediation 3.0 7.0 
Source:  BLS 
 
Occupations and education levels 
The sector employs a large number of medium and high-skilled professional and technical staff with 
expertise in business and finance, technicians and IT specialists. However, because occupational 
classifications vary, depending on traditions and different training systems and structures, national 
comparisons can be difficult.  For instance, because of its apprenticeship training system, German 
financial services employ a large number of clerks, while French financial services employ a high 
number of managerial staff.  Generally, however, in all countries the sector has a significantly higher 
share of professionals and medium-high-skilled people and of IT jobs than the average for the labour 
force as a whole. 
 In addition, the knowledge base of the financial services sector has improved over recent years, 
with new jobs requiring higher-level skills than previously. Many new functions and occupations also 
involve greater customer-orientation, and superior levels of formal education.  The distinction between 
back-office jobs (which previously did not involve much customer contact) and front-office/commercial 
jobs (which required such interaction) is blurring. 
 Further extensive changes can be expected in the traditional division of financial service work 
among front, middle, and back-office functions. The number of back-office administrative jobs are 
expected to decline, with the proportion between middle-skilled and high-skilled staff changing in the 
latter’s favour to reflect new requirements for staff to have strong financial and IT knowledge. It is 
expected that financial institutions will be required to reinforce the middle office, where such critical 
functions as financial accounting, reporting, accounting control, process control, risk management and 
management accounting are located. Jobs in this area demand high IT skills and a deep knowledge of 
financial processes, expertise in international commercial law and wide-ranging language skills, given 
the increasingly global nature of the operations of most firms.  Commercial and front-office jobs require 
skills in marketing, direct sales and client advisory services, a deep knowledge of financial products, 
people skills, including inter-personal communications, and IT capabilities. 
 Call-centre staff are increasingly employed on temporary contracts and have very high levels of 
turnover. In addition, more and more financial institutions are using workers subcontracted for this area 
of operation.  
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Information technology (IT) is central to all financial institutions’ operations, in both customer-
relations management (CRM) as well as every-day administrative and operational processes. IT is 
critical in new product research and development, the design and management of databases, 
optimization of organizational networks, marketing, systems security, etc.  Superior IT competence and 
intimate knowledge of financial processes have now become an essential combined qualification in 
many financial services jobs. The industry also employs many economists, mathematicians, actuaries, 
marketing and finance experts, industry research analysts and IT systems analysts and designers. The 
sector also requires management executives, mostly finance specialists, whose role is similar to that of 
other managers in the rest of the economy, to fill positions in headquarters, local branches and support 
services. Branch managers need to fulfil a commercial role and ensure close client communication. 
 Contrary to popular belief, many jobs in financial services are low-paid.  The median annual 
pay of bank tellers in May 2006 in the United States was about US$22,000, according to the BLS. 
These and other support functions are likely to witness extensive reductions through sectoral 
consolidation and cutbacks in response to the crisis. High-paying jobs were mainly related to 
investment banking, corporate banking and trader-dealer firms. From January to October 2008, for 
instance, the average compensation expense adjusted for workforce size in Goldman Sachs was down 
38% to US$351,000 from US$555,000 a year earlier. For Morgan Stanley, average compensation was 
US$231,000, down 17% for the same period.3 
Globalization and the financial crisis 
The financial industry used to be highly regulated and compartmentalized even within countries. 
Following changes made possible by advances in IT and spectacular trade expansion resulting from 
commitments on market access and national treatment for non-national businesses under the World 
Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a large and rapidly growing 
proportion of financial companies now operate globally. Even those operating solely at the national 
level are confronted with international competition on a daily basis. Indeed, financial markets can now 
be defined as arrangements of closely interlinked subsystems in which a wide range of assets based on 
such things as loans, inter-bank credit, real estate, exchange rates, shares and commodities are created 
in one country but can be traded anywhere around the world. Such trading has experienced explosive 
growth and profits over recent years. The United Kingdom – and the City of London in particular – has 
benefited greatly from the growth. 
 However, the globalization of the financial services sector means that decisions made in distant 
headquarters of major financial institutions have substantial employment repercussions in their far-flung 
subsidiaries.  Job reductions by Nomura of Japan, Deutsche Bank of Germany, UBS and Credit Suisse 
of Switzerland will impact workers in their American and British operations, as decisions by American 
Express, Citigroup, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley and the UK’s Lloyds TSB Group, RBS, and 
Barclays will affect jobs not only in those countries but also in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, etc. It is thus no longer possible to limit the examination of the employment impact of 
the crisis on financial sector workers at a single-country level, as the business and employment 
outcomes of managerial decisions extend well beyond the confines of a company’s home countries. 
 
3
 http://news.efinancialcareers.com/Blogs_ITEM/newsItemId-15608. 
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Part A:  The impact of the crisis on financial 
services employment 
Not surprisingly, given that the sector has been at the epicentre of the financial and economic crisis, 
jobs in financial services around the world have been strongly affected, with announced layoffs totalling 
325,000 between August 2007 and 12 February 2009. These figures almost certainly understate the real 
situation, as announcements of job cuts are not always forthcoming.  They are also unlikely to include 
layoffs from independent mortgage brokers, other independent contractors who provide subcontracting 
services to financial institutions, or the multitude of small financial firms who would not have had the 
resources to weather the crisis and may have gone out of business entirely. Indeed, press reports 
indicate that as of mid-2008, major British banks began to offer their top rates only to customers who 
approached them directly, restricting the number and type of mortgages on sale through brokers.4 In the 
United Kingdom, the banks’ decision to deprive brokers of their best rates has dealt a serious blow to 
the mortgage broking industry, which lost 15% of its members between the start of the credit crunch in 
August 2007 and mid-2008.  The number of mortgage advisers had fallen about 30,000 to 26,000 
during the same period. Almost three-quarters of the £15 billion in UK mortgages were previously sold 
through brokers, according to the UK Council of Mortgage Lenders. 
 There is a similar trend in the United States, where mortgage brokers are concerned at attempts 
by banks to marginalize them, as some of the country’s largest lenders move to block them from 
offering loans.  Brokers have long served as an important loan source, typically offering a wider range 
of mortgage products from a variety of lending institutions. 
 The banks argue that their action reflects a move toward more conservative business practices, 
but brokers complain that they are being made scapegoats for the credit crisis, and that consumers will 
suffer as a result.  Some legislators and consumer advocates have criticized brokers specialising in sub-
prime mortgages — loans typically offered to borrowers with poor credit-ratings. They charge that 
some brokers persuaded borrowers to apply for loans that were beyond their ability to repay. But 
mortgage brokers say they have been unfairly blamed for the industry’s failures in recent years. They 
point out that it is the lenders, not brokers, who ultimately approve a borrower’s application.5  
 The following table lists some of the 325,000 announced job cuts by banks, asset managers and 
insurers around the world from August 2007 to 12 February 2009. 
 
 
4
 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/money/property_and_mortgages/article4004332.ece. 
5
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/realestate/01mort.html?ref=todayspaper. 
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Table 5:  Number of job cuts from banks, insurers and funds since August 20076  
Company Jobs cut Headcount 
before August 
20077 
Latest 
headcount8 
Remarks 
PNC Financial 
Services  
  5,800 28,054  59,595 Feb. 3  
 
 
Includes jobs from merger with National 
City Corp on Dec. 31; job cuts at the 
combined group due to be completed by 
2011 
Bank of America  45,500 195,675 243,075 Dec. 31 
 
 
Includes 30,000-35,000 jobs to be cut 
over 3 years after the purchase of Merrill 
Lynch and 7,500 jobs to be cut over 2 
years after Countrywide Financial Corp 
acquisition 
Barclays   9,050 127,700 150,000 Jan. 15 
 
Includes 3,000 cuts after the acquisition of 
Lehman Brothers businesses 
Bear Stearns   1,500 N/A N/A 
 
Layoffs August 2007-April 2008, before 
takeover by JPMorgan 
Citigroup  75,000 361,000 323,000 Dec. 31  
Commerzbank   9,000  35,384   42,983 Sept. 30 All layoffs announced after the acquisition 
of Dresdner Bank 
Credit Suisse   7,320  45,600  50,300 Sept. 30  
Deutsche Bank   1,380  75,140  81,308 Sept. 30  
Fidelity 
Investments 
  4,000 Unavailable  44,400 Nov. 12  
Fidelity National   4,100 Unavailable Unavailable  
Financial Inc    Includes 1,500 cuts after purchase of 
three title insurers in December 2008 
First American   4,250   38,000   34,000 Oct. 309 Estimate 
Goldman Sachs   4,800   29,905   30,067 Nov. 28  
HSBC   2,850 312,577 335,000 Aug. 4  
ING Over 7,000 119,097 130,000 Jan. 27  
JP Morgan  16,900 179,664 224,961 Dec. 31 Includes 7,600 cuts announced after 
purchase of Bear Stearns and 9,200 
layoffs at former Washington Mutual Inc., 
bought by JP Morgan 
Lehman Brothers  12,570    N/A  N/A Includes about 6,000 job cuts made 
before the bank collapsed in September 
and an estimated 10,500 left jobless after 
the bank collapsed – about 8,000 others 
were transferred to Nomura and 10,000 to 
Barclays 
Merrill Lynch   3,300  61,900    N/A Layoffs before takeover by Bank of 
America closed on Jan. 1 
Morgan Stanley   8,680  45,845  46,964 Nov. 30  
National City 
Corp 
 7,400  32,445    N/A Layoffs before National City Corp merged 
with PNC on Dec. 31 
Nomura   1,480  16,854  26,318 Dec. 31 Includes 1,000 jobs cut after acquisition of 
Lehman Brothers units 
Santander  2,600 135,922 170,961 Dec. 31  
RBS  3,950 135,400 170,000 Nov. 14 Includes employees from ABN-AMRO, 
acquired in October 2007 
UBS 11,000  81,557  77,783 Dec. 31  
UniCredit   9,000 135,880 177,393 Sept. 30 Includes staff from Ukrsotsbank, acquired 
in January 2009 
 
 
6
 http://www.iii.co.uk/investment/detail/?display=news&code=cotn:BARC.L&action=article& articleid=7149688; 
sourced from company announcements and releases, Reuters reports. 
7
 Estimate based on earnings reports and management statements, but excluding headcount of firms acquired 
subsequently. 
8
 Headcount effective on the date provided between Aug. 2008 and Feb. 2009. 
9
 Estimate. 
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Close to 130,000 jobs, or 40% of the above losses were announced from October 2008 to 12 
February 2009, indicating a rapid acceleration in financial services job cuts over recent months. As the 
global economy sinks further into recession, and financial institutions’ assets experience even greater 
impairment, job losses can be expected to rise even faster. Indeed, other sources report that some 
financial firms are considering another round of job cuts. However, as many such firms have not 
confirmed these reports, they are excluded from this table, as are firms reporting job cuts below one 
thousand; another reason to consider that reported retrenchments substantially under-represent actual 
job losses. 
 Redundancies are expected in front, middle and back-office roles, and are likely to involve 
most occupations, including management, sales, human resources, office and administrative support, 
clerks and machine operators.  Even information technology specialists, exempted from previous major 
redundancy waves, such as those related to merger and acquisition rationalizations, expect to incur 
extensive job cuts. The investment banking industry, for example, is expected to see thousands of job 
cuts as mergers are completed and companies prepare for a slowdown in business.  IT support is likely 
to be hit hard as firms scale down for lower business volumes and merging firms cut out overlapping 
roles.  According to one analyst, as many as 50,000 IT professionals in banking may be laid off by the 
end of 2009.10 IT expenditure for 2009 by European investment banks was projected to drop 9% and 
15% for Europe and the United States, respectively. 
 While the world economy as a whole will feel the fallout from the crisis, financial centres like 
New York and London are projected to bear the brunt. Bankruptcies and consolidation resulting from 
the current crisis are expected to lead to significant financial job losses in these centres, as even stronger 
firms shed staff.  The New York State Governor has suggested that Wall Street job losses alone would 
top 45,000, while other estimates put these losses as high as 80,000 or half the projected total private 
sector job losses in the State. The impact will be major, considering that jobs in New York City’s 
finance, insurance and real estate sectors account for one-third of personal income earned in the city. 
The combined New York metropolitan area alone is expected to lose up to 100,000 financial services 
jobs. Other regional markets, such as Boston, that are similarly heavily dependent on financial services, 
can also expect significant job losses.11  For January 2009 alone, US financial services shed 42,000 
jobs.12 As might be expected, given the central role of the sub-sector in setting off the crisis, the US 
securities industry shed 17,600 jobs in the last three months of 2008, close to its fastest pace of decline 
in at least a decade.13 BLS statistics show that the net loss of securities jobs from September to 
November has only once been exceeded in a three-month period over the last ten years. The industry 
lost 18,800 jobs November 2001-February 2002, due to a recession and 11 September 2001. As a 
percentage of the industry workforce, employment in securities is shrinking at roughly twice the pace of 
US employment as a whole and twice as fast as the broad financial sector. 
 As the crisis spreads to all other credit categories, job reductions will almost certainly mount 
even faster. American Express, for instance, has announced that it is reducing its workforce by 7,000 
(about 10%) as part of cost reductions to save US$1.8 billion in 2009.  Management will bear the brunt 
of the job reductions and remaining executives could see pay frozen until conditions improve.  
 Given London’s status as one of the leading global finance hubs, restructuring decisions by 
financial institutions, including those headquartered elsewhere, have significant job implications for the 
United Kingdom. The employment impact on the British finance sector is expected to be equally 
substantial as in the United States. The decision by Credit Suisse to reduce its headcount by 5,300 (11% 
of its worldwide staff) could mean 650 posts in London. Nomura Holdings will also cut 1,000 jobs in 
London, a fifth of its local workforce, three months after acquiring Lehman Brothers’ European arm. 
Oxford Analytica, an economic consultancy, projected that London-based financial institutions would 
shed 30,000 jobs in 2008, with 2009 figures expected to be at least a third higher. The fallout across the 
wider London economy would be even more significant, with 194,000 jobs lost and total London jobs 
 
10
 http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2008/12/05/233751/50000-it-jobs-could-go-in-global-banking-
sector.htm 
11
 http://www.oxan.com/worldnextweek/2008-11-06/TalkingPointTue_Financialcentresfiscalcrunch.aspx. 
 
12
 http://www.cepr.net/index.php/data-bytes/jobs-bytes/employment-free-fall-continues,-unemployment-rate-
jumps-to-7.6-percent/. 
13
 http://news.efinancialcareers.com/News_ITEM/newsItemId-16416 
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declining from 4.71 million in 2008 to just over 4.51 million in 2010. The knock-on fiscal impact of the 
credit crunch due to a shrinking real economy is expected to be considerable. As in the United States, 
loss of lucrative financial jobs and slashing of bonuses would have knock-on effects on employment in 
other sectors, leading to the loss of one to two other jobs for every financial sector redundancy.14 The 
sharp rise in corporate and individual bankruptcies, with a 51.6% year-to-year increase in company 
liquidations in England and Wales, spells more trouble to come for the British financial industry and its 
employment.  Integrating HBOS into the Lloyds Banking Group, following a Government-backed 
takeover of HBOS by Lloyds, also puts approximately 30,000 jobs at risk in the combined company, 
now 43% government-owned. Job reductions are expected through closure of overlapping branches, 
call centres and IT integration. According to media reports, Lloyds plans on making £790 million 
savings from cuts in the merged banks’ retail operations and £235 million by folding together their 
insurance and investment businesses.  Costs in wholesale and international banking will be reduced by 
£430 million. The recent loss of over £11 billion due to the takeover is likely to increase the bank’s 
determination to extract the maximum savings possible from rationalizing operations.15 
 Other cities around the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries with major 
financial services centres can expect thousands of redundancies before the crisis is over.  Dexia, the 
Franco-Belgian banking group, bailed out by the Belgian Government in September 2009, has, for 
instance, announced substantial job cuts across its global operations. The company intends to cut 700-
800 positions, about half of them from its Belgian operations. Its reorganization plan, announced in 
November 2008, foresees 15% cost savings over three years. However, Dexia indicated the reductions 
will avoid involuntary redundancies and promised to consult its European Works Council and works 
councils in subsidiaries in different European countries on the plan’s modalities. 
 Ireland is among the European countries whose banking sector has been most affected by the 
crisis.  The Government has nationalized Anglo Irish Bank and taken strategic shareholding positions in 
two other major lenders, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks. Ulster Bank, a subsidiary of the UK’s 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), now 70% owned by the British Government, is closing its First Active 
subsidiary, folding that business into its own operations, enabling the group to reduce costs by shedding 
750 jobs, up to 550 in the Republic and 200 in Northern Ireland. Forty-five First Active branches will 
be closed and the remaining 15 will be transferred to Ulster Bank. A voluntary severance package 
would be offered to staff. This development is considered to be just the start of what is expected to be a 
radical reshaping of Irish banking; despite deterioration in business conditions, banks had hitherto 
eschewed payroll cuts, opting instead for recruitment and pay freezes as well as cuts in bonuses.  The 
Bank of Ireland also announced up to 600 job reductions in its 4000-strong UK workforce, but not yet 
any among its Irish-based staff.  Irish Life Permanent, the State’s largest mortgage lender and life 
pensions company, has offered staff up to €35,000 to take career breaks. Activity in Irish banking has 
fallen dramatically, so a reduction across the sector is expected, especially given the increased risks to 
the taxpayer from the bank bailout plan. The Irish retail banking sector employs 41,000 people, with 
94,000 for the overall financial services. 
 Japan has just experienced the steepest drop in economic output since the 1974 oil shock.  In 
addition, given the fact that banks are faced with rising costs of bad loans and heavy losses on stock 
portfolios in client companies, the outlook for the sector is particularly grim. While redundancies in the 
Japanese financial industry have not yet matched those recorded in the US or the UK, there has been 
downsizing in property-related areas and reductions in fixed-income headcounts as banks cut back their 
bond trading to reflect the fact that the current crisis was largely caused by a lack of risk and credit 
control in fixed-income products. For most of 2008, Japanese financial institutions continued to focus 
energy on improving their retail sales force, particularly in the insurance, investment management and 
private banking subsectors.  Even as assets-under-management declined, most firms were interested in 
maintaining sufficient levels of competent front-line sales and client service professionals. Demand was 
similarly steady for financial controllers and internal auditors with capital-market product knowledge, 
given the continued focus on regulatory issues.16 For 2009, industry analysts expect continued demand 
 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 http://www.bankingtimes.co.uk/03112008-formation-of-lloyds-banking-group-puts-30000-jobs-at-risk/. 
16
 http://news.efinancialcareers.jp/newsandviews_item/newsItemId-16691. 
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for expertise in risk management and compliance; financial control and internal audit; mergers and 
acquisitions; and an increase in professional contract and temporary recruitment, in view of continuing 
budget constraints and payroll restrictions. Conversely, given the ongoing focus on reducing costs, there 
will be few job opportunities for human resource professionals, cutbacks in demand for skills on 
derivatives and securitized financial products, prime brokers and hedge fund specialists. 
 Despite pressure on their funding and rising bad loans, Australian financial companies remain 
highly profitable, while their overseas competitors survive only on government support, are 
nationalized or allowed to collapse.  Some Australian companies are nonetheless reducing staff. In 
September 2008, Macquarie slashed its global headcount by 1,047 to 12,851, following two write-
downs totalling $2 billion and a halving of its profitability. Babcock & Brown announced that by 2010, 
it intends to have cut its workforce by two-thirds, or 850 jobs, leaving just 650 employees. Among 
Australia’s Big Four, the Australian Finance Sector Union (FSU) reported that job losses for 2008 
included 1,000 for ANZ, 179 at the National Australia Bank (NAB) and 450 at Westpac.  Other 
financial companies announcing redundancies in Australia in 2008 included Insurance Australia Group 
(600), UBS 50), Merrill Lynch (20) and Goldman Sachs (10). The FSU estimates that 2008 saw almost 
5,000 job losses in the financial industry, though this seems an understatement, as an industry observer 
puts the losses at closer to 19,000 based on company briefings to analysts and media reports.17 For 
2009, NAB has already announced plans to cut another 120 staff from MLC, its wealth management 
unit, with layoffs mainly affecting back-office employees.18 Jobs in operations related to real estate and 
back-office functions are likely to remain at risk throughout 2009. Mergers and acquisitions will 
probably similarly continue to exert downward pressure on employment, especially in back-office and 
head office management roles. Some analysts believe that Westpac’s takeover of St. George may result 
in 2,000 such redundancies, although the numbers have not yet been confirmed. Merging in the middle 
of a global meltdown could make banks even more disposed to reduce payroll costs during a takeover. 
 Africa was initially believed to be one of the few regions that would survive almost unmarked 
by the global financial turmoil. The region’s banks focussed on domestic markets, were relatively well 
regulated, had very little exposure to the toxic debts of the Western financial system as the market for 
derivatives was almost non-existent; and local secondary markets were very small. There was optimism 
that the continent might avoid the looming worldwide recession altogether by boosting commodity 
exports to China, whose appetite for Africa’s oil and minerals had dramatically expanded in recent 
years. As the crisis has worsened, however, it became clear that African economies would suffer serious 
damage, hampering the continent’s recent poverty-reduction advances. Although there is currently no 
information on financial services layoffs in the region, some observers believe there will indeed be such 
effects and they will be manifold.  First, there could be fall-out within the banking system because of 
extensive foreign ownership; if a parent bank outside the region is suffering, it might affect its affiliate 
in Africa. The second effect will be a potential decline in private capital flows, including remittances 
from the African Diaspora, which have been rising faster in Africa than in any other part of the world 
over the last three years. The third will be the potential decline in commodity prices.  A fourth is the 
macroeconomic imbalances, which are independent of the financial crisis, in some African countries; 
these may require adjustment efforts that the financial crisis may speed up. Another danger is that 
foreign aid will decline if, as a result of recession in donor countries, governments decide to cut back on 
foreign aid. All these factors will affect the African financial services sector and its employment 
capacity. It is, however, difficult to forecast their impact on the sector’s jobs. 
 In the United States, women tend to be strongly represented in sectors that are still growing, 
such as health and education.  However, because women are also over-represented in such occupations 
as receptionists and clerical workers in sectors that have suffered heavy reductions, many have faced 
above-average levels of job loss. In American financial services, for example, women held about 59% 
of the jobs, but accounted for a disproportionately high 76% (102,000 posts) of the 134,000 job losses. 
They may also see more job losses in future as redundancies spread in tandem with the crisis.19 No 
usable sectoral data to illustrate gender-differentiated employment impacts in the United Kingdom 
exists, but there is disagreement in Government over the extent to which women are losing jobs faster 
 
17
 http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/bad-signs-as-the-cbd-empties/2008/12/09/1228584832867.html. 
18
 http://news.efinancialcareers.com.au/newsandviews_item/newsItemId-17093. 
19
 http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE50L12T20090122. 
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than men. Though the latest unemployment statistics showed the number of women full-time workers to 
have fallen by 53,000 in the fourth quarter 2008 compared with a drop of 36,000 for men, officials point 
to increasing part-time employment among women, and higher male redundancy and unemployment 
rates, thus it is impossible from the data to draw conclusions on the gender and employment-specific 
impacts of the recession. The social partners also insist that there is no evidence of a problem, with the 
federation of small businesses cautioning the Government against premature measures. The Trades 
Union Congress also concedes that the increased female labour participation compared with previous 
recessions mean more women than previously would experience the effects of the recession. 
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Part B. Possible policy responses 
As documented in Part A, the crisis is leading to significant job losses in the financial sector. From the 
policy perspective, three different challenges can be identified: i) a permanent decline in overall activity 
and employment after years of expansion; ii) stagnation and even deceleration in income growth; and 
iii) restructuring within the financial sector as many financial institutions, including whole sectors of the 
industry, have disappeared due to mergers and acquisitions, gone out of business, or changed their 
operating models.20 More fundamentally, the crisis has hit the sector unevenly, affecting employment in 
some activities more than in others. In particular, employment in investment banking has shrunk 
strongly, while traditional depository and credit bank activities’ employment has slightly decreased and 
employment in funds and trusts has continued to grow. It is likely that further labour reallocation among 
financial sub-sectors will occur in the near future.     
 Two different scenarios are considered: one showing a more positive picture regarding 
employment in the sector for the next two years and the other a more worrying one. However, both 
scenarios coincide on a slump in employment expected to take place during the following years. How 
long these destructive effects will last is difficult to predict. But whether employment in the sector 
approaches the more positive or negative scenario will depend heavily on the timing and type of 
policies that governments put in place to mitigate the effects of the crisis. The following policy 
recommendations aim at preparing the ground for a faster recovery of the sector, and bringing it a 
positive scenario of employment growth. 
1. Adopting a comprehensive strategy to respond to 
the crisis 
To a large extent, the outlook for the financial sector depends on the overall policy strategy adopted to 
respond to the crisis. The current financial crisis has now become global and therefore requires a global 
policy approach. Bail-out plans of the financial sector, crucial as they are, are insufficient. The world 
economy is being affected by a vicious circle of rapidly declining confidence that leads to lower 
demand, output and employment, which in turn further depresses confidence. What is needed is a 
global, coordinated stimulus package that breaks this vicious circle and responds to the current 
problems of failing capital markets, drying-up of credit and massive job losses. 21 
 Such a policy package would to be based on the following broad principles: 
 An immediate policy objective is to stabilize the financial sector and restore confidence to 
capital markets. In addition, a macroeconomic stimulus package is needed to boost overall demand, 
thereby supporting the economy and job creation.  
To mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis on disposable incomes and income inequality, 
social welfare systems need to be strengthened and workers’ rights protected. Experience shows that 
social dialogue, as part of the Decent Work Agenda, can be instrumental in designing an effective 
package of measures. 
Finally, the massive impact of the crisis for the financial sector needs to be mitigated by social 
policies that cushion the adverse effects on employment and disposable income and help those who lose 
their jobs in the sector to return quickly to employment. 
 These measures are essential to stabilize the economy and thereby also help improve the 
outlook for the financial sector. In addition, specific policies targeted towards stabilizing job-creation 
 
20
 The first segment to disappear was non-bank mortgage origination, of which the most notable firm was 
Countrywide, absorbed by the Bank of America in early 2008. Other segments including ‘monoline’ bond 
insurance followed. However, the most striking event so far has been the disappearance of Wall Street investment 
banks, with Lehman Brothers going bankrupt, Bear Stearns and Merrill forced to merge and the survivors -- 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley -- converting themselves to commercial banks in order to secure government 
protection. And this is only the beginning of the restructuring of the financial sector. (Quiggin, 2008). 
21
 International Institute for Labour Studies (2008a). 
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prospects and maintaining employment are necessary as the sector undergoes a period of major 
restructuring. The following section looks closer at policies to tackle the economic and social 
consequences for the financial sector. 
2.  Helping finance sector workers cope with the crisis  
 
There is widespread recognition that the crisis is partly due to a variety of practices and instruments in 
use in recent years, and to irresponsible risk-taking in the financial sector. Yet the majority of the 
sector’s workers had no role in causing the crisis and need support to find new jobs, adapt their skills 
and sometimes embark on a new career.       
 It is therefore important to adopt measures that: i) provide adequate, well-designed 
unemployment benefits and social protection; ii) support job-search and placement into new jobs, which 
may sometimes necessitate new skill development measures –all the more important, because, as noted 
earlier, the sector is likely to shrink, leading to a permanent reduction in employment; many job losers 
will therefore need to obtain jobs in other sectors; iii) strengthen social dialogue within financial 
institutions to mitigate the adverse social effects of the crisis and pave the way for a healthier sector; 
and iv) guarantee that contractual commitments made vis-à-vis workers are honoured, especially for 
those financial enterprises that are forced to leave the market (employees may have to take legal action 
to protect their rights at work).  In addition, as discussed later, compensation packages for executive and 
trading staff will need to be modified so as to limit rewards for excessive risk-taking. 
Access to social protection 
Policies are needed to ensure that financial sector workers laid off during the crisis are properly 
protected against substantial losses of income. In particular, lower-level employees are unlikely to 
receive generous severance payments and will have to rely on unemployment benefits. In some 
countries, policies are currently being introduced to extend the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefit. As the crisis unfolds, policymakers are urged to ensure that finance sector employees continue 
to be appropriately covered and supported in new job search. 
 Even those employees – often highly-skilled specialists – that have contractual guarantees for 
severance payments are at risk as the crisis brings down entire financial institutions. 
 In addition, governments should ensure that finance sector employees continue to benefit from 
relevant social services such as health. Currently, in countries like the United States, health-care 
insurance is tightly linked to employment, so there is a higher risk of losing proper health coverage as 
well as jobs. In Japan, too, the growing ranks of newly unemployed temporary or part-time workers 
have no company-based unemployment benefits to rely on and there are mounting signs of incidences 
of extreme poverty. Unemployment benefits, social protection and employment protection are 
embedded in ILO Conventions that many member States have ratified. It is especially important to 
apply these conventions in the current context. This will reinforce automatic stabilizers, thereby 
supporting economic recovery. 
Activation policies and effective public employment 
services 
Effective activation policies could play a crucial role in promoting the re-employment prospects of job-
losers from the financial sector. The main elements of these programmes include employment services 
(such as job matching, career guidance and job-search support; adequate management of unemployment 
benefits; and referral of jobseekers to reintegration programmes after a period of unsuccessful job 
search). In certain cases, employment programmes like direct job creation or subsidized jobs can also 
play a useful role –especially to avoid demotivation among job seekers. These programmes, if well 
designed, have proved to be very beneficial, helping cushion economic shocks without jeopardizing 
growth when the upswing sets in. For example, universal social policies such as those used by Nordic 
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countries (e.g. Denmark, Sweden) have encouraged economic development by maintaining high 
employment and strong labour force participation while at the same time leading to favourable social 
outcomes (see World of Work Report 200822, Chapter 6). 
 There is a strong case for designing specific training programmes for unemployed workers from 
the financial sector who have been without work for a long period. As already noted, many of these job 
losers will have to find a job outside the sector, which may involve acquiring new skills.  
 Whether government support to the financial sector should be made conditional on job 
guarantees or not is a complex issue, which needs to be addressed taking into account national 
institutions and practices. However, supporting some of the existing jobs, at least for a limited period of 
time, may be an effective policy. This of course needs to be coordinated with the policy approach 
adopted for other sectors –where many innocent victims of the crisis are also losing their jobs.          
 
Using social dialogue to help manage the effects of the 
crisis… 
Social dialogue is crucial to balance conflicting interests and is especially important in the context of 
the crisis.23 Finance sector workers may be willing to accept the inevitability of downsizing and 
restructuring, and even layoffs. But workers also call for management to inform and consult their staff 
or their representatives before drastic decisions are taken. Moreover, social dialogue can help design 
training and other programmes that support job losers and facilitate later recovery of the sector.  
 The Conclusions of the Tripartite Meeting on the Employment Impact of Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the Banking and Financial Services Sector of February 2001 remain valid in the current 
crisis. These specified, among other things, that all possible measures short of terminations, such as 
international transfers, restriction of overtime work and reduction of normal hours of work, should first 
be considered in case of the need for staff rationalization. 
Avoiding counterproductive solutions: early retirement 
and outsourcing     
During crises, when job redundancies become the chosen measure to contain costs in enterprises to 
allow them to stay in the market, several alternatives to lay-offs (early retirement, outsourcing, flexible 
staffing and work methods, etc.) exist, with more or less adverse consequences for the long-term 
performance of the labour market. In particular, early retirement programmes that have been 
widespread in the past have proved to be damaging for both fiscal sustainability and employment 
prospects among the elderly. Evidence suggests that gradual retirement policies and measures that help 
workers acquire a new career are to be preferred in this respect, as they help employees to keep in touch 
with the labour market.  Of course, governments may need to ensure that such measures do not 
substantially damage the capacity for these employees to find a more stable form of employment. 
 During the Asian crisis in Thailand, for example, KTB Securities Company initially retained all 
staff, including those from acquired banks, but eventually restructured its combined operation, 
introducing incentives to encourage early retirement which resulted in the departure of 2,372 employees 
at the taxpayers’ expense, with long-term adverse consequences for the labour market. Spain provides 
another example of the dangers of forced early retirement. According to the finance sector trade union, 
jobs in the banking sector declined from 180,000 to 129,000 between 1980 and December 1999, mainly 
due to merger-linked early retirements, sometimes thinly disguised as voluntary. Under these 
circumstances, it is recommended that policy measures be implemented to ensure that banks and 
financial institutions bear the full costs of their restructuring activities and are not allowed to increase 
the taxpayers’ burden. In particular, measures that cause long-term damage to the proper functioning of 
the labour market – such as forced early retirement – should be avoided.  
 
 
22
 INST (2008b) 
23
 ILO (2001). 
 GDFFCW- 2009-02-018-1-EN.Doc /v2 23 
3. Policies for a more effective finance sector serving 
the real economy 
Challenges also lie ahead for those employees that continue to work in the financial services industry. 
Apart from major restructuring efforts, existing banks and financial institutions need to concentrate on 
their core business. This will require incentives to move towards less risky activities and avoid 
excessive risk taking. This calls for changing corporate governance of the banking sector, including a 
fresh look at remuneration packages of executive and trading staff. In particular, compensation 
packages and earnings growth of these employees could better reflect their ability to fulfil the lending 
role of the institutions that employ them.  
Realigning executive pay, dividend policies and 
corporate goals  
Rewarding risk-taking rather than sustainable growth in economic value is considered as one of the 
factors behind the financial crisis. Indeed the reward system for executives and bank managers needs to 
be adapted to prevent excessive risk-taking. The existing remuneration model leads to misallocation of 
risk and places burdens on those least capable of taking on large gambles.  
 In defining appropriate executive compensation packages, experts recommend that reward must 
depend on high performance attained through the right mix between risk-taking and risk management. 
As part of this approach, individual incentives would be realigned with the long-term performance of 
the enterprise. In this respect, some have argued that such a realignment of incentives would require 
abolishing shareholder value as an indicator of success for the compensation schemes of managers. 
They contend that financial institutions, by their very nature as businesses, are legally obliged to 
maximize profits for shareholders and it was up to the government to provide the regulations within 
which they operated.  There can be no disagreement on this obligation.  As is now clear, however, 
excessive risk-taking does not necessarily lead to profit maximization; it may rather lead to total 
destruction of shareholder value. In any case, some countries, such as the United Kingdom, have moved 
in the direction of requiring that government capital injections come with restrictions on executive pay 
and dividend policies. This could be used as a possible reform approach in other countries. Another 
policy recommendation24 is to redirect executive payments away from short-term cash toward longer-
term payments. Withholding a portion of annual compensation depending on performance goals allows 
their subsequent adaptation to eventual adverse conditions that can be clearly linked to previous 
executive action. 
 
Revisiting corporate governance  
Multi-stakeholder coordination in financial institutions may be improved to ensure better coordination 
and implementation of agreed international corporate governance standards. Remuneration and 
incentive systems are supposed to align the interests of corporate officials with the long-term interest of 
the enterprise and shareholders. Developments in corporate governance mechanisms have led to an 
increasing use of performance-related pay systems for executive managers and directors, but empirical 
studies show that such systems have little effect, if any, on the performance of financial institutions. 
Moreover, wide variations exist, with examples in some countries displaying virtually no relationship 
between performance-related pay and company profits. On the contrary, evidence suggests that 
managers are in a dominant wage-bargaining position with respect to owners, partly as a result of 
institutional flaws. Distortions in these structures are dangerous, since they may lead to a short-term 
bias towards additional risk-taking, a particular concern for the financial industry. There have been calls 
from some quarters for employee representation in corporate governance, which might help realign the 
interests of different stakeholders. Strengthening the role of the enterprise’s board and allowing other 
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stakeholders to participate can counterbalance managerial power and may limit excessive risk-taking. 
This measure is especially relevant in the finance sector, given the abovementioned problems of 
excessive management compensation.   
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The finance sector is currently undergoing a deep and thorough restructuring, and the crisis has hit the 
sector unevenly, which may result in labour movement among financial sub-sectors. This will reinforce 
the impetus towards structural changes similar to those experienced until now. 
 This restructuring of the finance sector cannot take place without substantial consequences for 
both employment and income of current employees in this industry. In fact, the sector is already 
experiencing a permanent decline in overall activity after years of expansion, which is triggering 
significant job losses. Moreover, evidence shows stagnation and even deceleration in income growth.  
 Measures that help workers cope with the crisis in the sector would serve social and economic 
goals. These include adequate, well-designed unemployment benefits and social protection, activation 
policies and effective public employment services. They would not only support the income of affected 
workers, but also facilitate transition to new jobs and reduce the risk of long-term unemployment and 
inactivity. There is also a strong case for launching re-training programmes targeted on finance sector 
workers, given the likely cut in total employment in the sector.      
 This paper also considers measures that encourage moving towards a more effective finance 
sector that focuses on the needs of the real economy. One of the proposed options is to build incentives 
that encourage the sector to shift to less risky activities through an improved corporate governance 
structure. This could include rationalizing executive pay and dividend policies.  
 Social dialogue among employers and trade unions in the sector can greatly support adoption of 
effective measures. Social dialogue is also crucial in ensuring that the measures specific to the sector 
are well designed. 
